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A Workers’ Cold War 
in the Quad Cities: 
The Fate of Labor Militancy in the 
Farm Equipment Industry, 1949–1955 
MATTHEW M. METTLER 
BEGINNING IN 1949, the Quad Cities of Iowa and Illinois 
were, in the words of one newspaper reporter, the “scene of the 
country’s largest union war.”1 That war was, in fact, a protracted 
civil war within the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) 
to define the future of American industrial unionism. As the 
Cold War deepened, the unions that composed the CIO dis-
agreed over how best to maintain strength in the face of a re-
newed business and government assault on labor unions and 
the militant tactics they had employed in the 1930s. By 1949, 
eleven left-led unions that represented more than one million 
workers and defended militant trade union practices had left 
or had been forced out of the CIO. Those unions immediately 
became recruiting targets of the remaining CIO unions. The 
ensuing conflict between rival industrial labor unions surfaced 
throughout the country, but rarely was the conflict as enduring 
and violent as it was in the Quad Cities, where the United Auto 
Workers (UAW) engaged in a sustained effort to raid and gain 
jurisdiction over all farm implement workers in the left-led 
Farm Equipment and Metal Workers of America (FE).  
 
1. Moline Daily Dispatch, 2/10/1949. 
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 At stake in this raiding war was the future of the strong cur-
rent of militant industrial unionism in the farm equipment plants 
of the Quad Cities. Rank-and-file support for the FE remained 
strong after the union’s expulsion from the CIO and its subse-
quent merger with the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine 
Workers (UE) in late 1949, but a devastating strike at Interna-
tional Harvester in 1952 and a poor contract helped build sup-
port for the UAW.2 By 1954 the UAW had succeeded in taking 
the largest FE-UE locals at International Harvester, and by 1955 
the remaining locals had disaffiliated as a group from the UE 
and voted on a local-by-local basis to affiliate with either the 
UAW or the International Association of Machinists.  
 Drawing mainly from union archives, press coverage, and 
oral histories from participants, this article will set these events 
in context and assess the rationale of the FE-UE locals as they 
gradually chose to leave their militant left-led union in favor of 
more conservative mainstream unions. The desertion of the FE-
UE may appear to be evidence of the rank-and-file’s conserva-
tism and rejection of the core ideals of left-led unionism; the 
move toward mainstream unionism is better understood, how-
ever, as a difficult but pragmatic attempt to preserve those core 
ideals. For the purpose of this study, the core ideals of labor mil-
itancy include the high value placed on rank-and-file democracy, 
local autonomy, an active shop-floor presence of union stewards, 
and a bargaining approach that sought to increase workers’ con-
trol of production and profit through conflict rather than co-
operation with management.  
 All too often historical accounts of the CIO’s ideological and 
organizational shift from democratic labor militancy to bureau-
cratic centrism following World War II gloss over the extraordi-
nary conflict surrounding the transition. Such analysis is in part 
grounded in a school of thought that finds labor militancy to be 
transient in the complex American working-class consciousness, 
a refuge of last resort for workers in dire economic straits. That 
interpretation suggests that as the Great Depression gave way to 
the affluence and security of the postwar era, workers were satis-
fied with the rise in their standard of living and thus dropped 
                                                 
2. After the FE and UE merged in 1949, all FE locals adopted a split acronym: 
FE-UE.  
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their allegiance to left-led unions. Labor historian Michael Ka-
zin cites this postwar moment as the end of the CIO as a social 
movement; workers, “grateful for union protection . . . could 
now leave the marching and sloganeering to others.” Historian 
Robert H. Zieger cuts to the heart of this interpretation in the 
conclusion to his comprehensive study of the CIO: “I do not be-
lieve that there was a leftward-tending working-class militancy 
in the 1930s that CIO bureaucracy defanged or diverted.”3  
 On the other end of the spectrum are labor historians who 
argue that the postwar CIO bureaucracy did exactly that: the 
movement toward bureaucracy and centrism, they argue, ceded 
labor’s strength for short-term gains and laid the foundation for 
the ensuing decline of the labor movement. So-called new labor 
historians in the 1960s and 1970s established the argument that 
a leftward tendency in the working class can be understood as a 
resurgence of an enduring producerist ideal. That ideal matured 
during the massive industrialization of the late nineteenth cen-
tury as mechanization and the division of labor began to dis-
tance workers from the fruits of their labor. 4 The legacy of pro-
ducerism can be found in social democratic politics, but also in 
workplace-centered syndicalism. This latter tradition guided 
workers to embrace militant tactics such as work stoppages to 
reassert their control over the production process. Producerist 
                                                 
3. Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion: An American History (Ithaca, NY, 
1998), 162; Robert H. Zieger, The CIO, 1935–1955 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1995), 376. 
Besides Kazin’s, notable studies stressing the lack of popular support for (or 
the fleeting nature of) militant unionism during the period under examination 
include Bill Goode, Infighting in the UAW: The 1946 Election and the Ascendancy 
of Walter Reuther (Westport, CT, 1994); Bert Cochran, Labor and Communism: The 
Conflict that Shaped American Unions (Princeton, NJ, 1977); and Harvey A. Lev-
enstein, Communism, Anti-Communism, and the CIO (Westport, CT, 1981). 
4. Significant studies informing this argument during the period under examina-
tion include Stephen Meyer, “Stalin over Wisconsin”: The Making and Unmaking of 
Militant Unionism, 1900–1950 (New Brunswick, NJ, 1992); Halpern, UAW Politics 
in the Cold War Era; Steve Rosswurm, ed., The CIO’s Left-Led Unions (New Bruns-
wick, NJ, 1992); Nelson Lichtenstein, Labor’s War at Home: The CIO in World War 
II (Cambridge, 1982); and idem, Walter Reuther: The Most Dangerous Man in De-
troit (New York, 1995). The contemporary consequences of the decline in labor 
militancy are captured well in Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and 
Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–1980 (Princeton, NJ, 1989), esp. Nelson Lichten-
stein’s essay, “From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining: Organized Labor 
and the Eclipse of Social Democracy in the Postwar Era,” 122–52. 
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syndicalism found renewed enthusiasm among workers under 
the banner of industrial democracy during World War I and re-
surfaced in the 1930s CIO in calls for rank-and-file democracy.5  
 This article is informed more by the latter group of historians 
who stress the continuity of producerism, but I aim to avoid the 
polarized nature of this debate in two ways. First, the scope of 
my research and analysis is local and is intended to provide only 
a fragmentary but important piece of a much larger narrative. 
Historians’ focus on the powerful swath of national Cold War 
labor politics tends to overshadow the broad range of local strug-
gles that compose a complex tapestry of working-class experi-
ence. To this end, this article adds to a trend in the historical study 
of labor and the Cold War that confines its scope to localities.6  
 Second, my research on the Quad Cities has led me to stress 
the divide between the economic and political/social compo-
nents of left-led unionism. Left-led industrial unions such as the 
FE and UE adhered to producerist trade union principles, but 
also espoused progressive social causes regarding racial and 
gender equity and a foreign policy critical of the prevailing U.S. 
foreign policy. As Gerald Zahavi has suggested in his work on 
militant UE locals in Schenectady, New York, producerism and 
progressive social politics were often mutually exclusive in the 
minds of workers, but not in their left-led unions. Zahavi uses 
the concept of “right-wing Communists” to describe a segment 
of workers who were committed to “traditional rank-and-file 
concerns” regarding their union’s economic practice, but wa-
vered when the progressive social agenda of left-wing Commu-
                                                 
5. On the roots and legacy of producerism, see Shelton Stromquist, “The Crisis 
of 1894 and the Legacies of Producerism,” in Richard Schneirov, Shelton Strom-
quist, and Nick Salvatore, eds., The Pullman Strike and the Crisis of the 1890s: 
Essays on Labor and Politics (Urbana and Chicago, 1999), 179–203; and Bruce 
Laurie, Artisans into Workers: Labor in Nineteenth-Century America (New York, 
1989). On industrial democracy, see Joseph A. McCartin, Labor’s Great War: The 
Struggle for Industrial Democracy and the Origins of Modern American Labor Rela-
tions, 1912–1921 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1997).  
6. Two recently edited collections provide an excellent foundation for the study 
of labor during the Cold War with an emphasis on local labor politics: see Shel-
ton Stromquist, ed., Labor’s Cold War: Local Politics in a Global Context (Urbana 
and Chicago, 2008); and Robert W. Cherny, William Issel, and Kieran Walsh 
Taylor, eds., American Labor and the Cold War: Grassroots Politics and Postwar 
Political Culture (New Brusnwick, NJ, 2004).  
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nists in the union threatened either the “white-male” nature of 
their union traditions or their sense of American nationalism.7  
 Left-led unions had the capacity to attract a constituency 
based on their producerist vision of workers’ control as well as 
to alienate those who resisted their left-wing brand of social and 
political progressivism, especially in regard to racial equality in 
the workplace. The case of the Quad Cities FE-UE suggests that 
the conflation of political and social radicalism with producerist 
radicalism has oversimplified scholarly understanding of Ameri-
can labor radicalism and overshadowed the degree to which a 
producerist culture remained alive and well into the 1950s.  
 
TO THE UAW, with its 800,000 members, the Quad Cities were 
a key spot in taking over the smaller FE constituency of 50,000. 
The Quad Cities lie 175 miles west of Chicago and span the Iowa-
Illinois border. Along with Chicago, the Quad Cities contained 
one of the largest concentrations of farm equipment manufac-
turing in the country, with approximately 10,000 FE members 
in each.8 After their formation in the late 1930s and early 1940s, 
the 11 FE locals in the Quad Cities established a reputation both 
within their own union and in the industry at large for their mili-
tancy, as evidenced by their high number of shop floor actions in 
the immediate postwar period. As the largest industrial employer 
in the Quad Cities, the International Harvester Company and its 
Farmall subdivision in Rock Island and East Moline were home 
to the largest FE locals, although John Deere and Company and 
several other smaller farm equipment firms, such as French and 
Hecht and Herman Nelson Corporation, employed more than a 
third of the Quad Cities FE membership.  
                                                 
7. Gerald Zahavi, “Passionate Commitments: Race, Sex, and Communism at 
Schenectady General Electric, 1932–1954,” Journal of American History 83 (1996), 
539–44. 
8. Ibid. After World War II, the Quad Cities consisted of Davenport, Iowa, and 
Rock Island, Moline, and East Moline, Illinois. There are really five cities in the 
area; Bettendorf, Iowa, is often included over East Moline as a member of the 
Quad Cities. William Roba, The River and the Prairie: A History of the Quad-Cities, 
1812–1960 (Quad Cities, 1986), 121. Most of the large FE-UE locals operated in 
plants on the Illinois side, but members resided on both sides of the border. 
The UAW membership figures listed above are approximate totals for 1948. 
See Martin Halpern, UAW Politics in the Cold War Era (Albany, NY, 1988), 3. 
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 The UAW began its raiding offensive against the Quad Cities 
FE locals on the morning of February 11, 1949. With the FE con-
tracts expiring, the UAW hoped to gain enough support among 
FE members to force new elections for union representation be-
fore collective bargaining began. This particular raiding effort 
was a top priority for the UAW. Coming two months after the 
FE’s final rejection of a CIO ultimatum to dissolve and join the 
UAW, the raid marked the beginning of what would be a turbu-
lent year for the CIO — a year that ended with the expulsion of 
11 “Communist-dominated” unions, including the FE. Lending 
authority and publicity to the raid was UAW vice-president Jack 
Livingston, who led the 50 UAW handbill distributors outside 
the gates of the East Moline Harvester plant.9  
 Foreshadowing the next five years of conflict between the 
two unions, the handbilling erupted into a violent riot that 
raged for 30 minutes. Even with the aid of 30 local UAW mem-
bers from a nearby John Deere Plant, the UAW side was badly 
outnumbered by roughly 300 FE members. By the time police 
arrived, scores were injured and 13 men, most aligned with the 
UAW, were taken to the hospital with serious injuries. The ori-
gins of the riot, as reported, are cloudy; each side blamed the 
other for provoking the violence. What is clear, however, is that 
both the UAW organizers and the FE members coming off their 
shift came prepared for conflict with clubs, brass knuckles, pad-
ded coats, and even steel helmets.10  
 In the aftermath of the riot, UAW regional director Pat 
Greathouse, who would administer the Quad Cities locals if 
they left the FE, justified the raid on the grounds of Communist 
domination of the FE. He vowed not to relent “until the iron 
curtain that FE officials have dropped around their members is 
lifted.” The president of FE Local 104 at Harvester, Arvid Sheets, 
countered that “the UAW has destroyed their organized locals 
in the Allis-Chalmers and J. I. Case farm equipment plants 
through misleadership.” Workers, he asserted, “cannot afford to 
be used as pawns in the political game of UAW top officials.”11  
                                                 
9. Moline Daily Dispatch, 2/10/1949. 
10. Rock Falls Record, 2/11/1949. 
11. Moline Daily Dispatch, 2/10/1949; Chicago Daily Times, 2/11/1949. 
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 Sheets’s mention of the UAW’s “misleadership” of its Allis-
Chalmers local is instructive for understanding the UAW’s 
anti-Communist postwar turn and its subsequent drive to take 
over FE-UE locals in the Quad Cities. UAW Local 248 at Allis-
Chalmers’s West Allis, Wisconsin, plant had a reputation for 
labor militancy. Rank-and-file support for the local’s militant 
leadership had been especially apparent three years earlier. On 
April 29, 1946, its members voted 8,091 to 251 to strike the giant 
farm implement manufacturer. At the center of the strike was 
the local’s insistence on retaining wartime gains that translated 
into workers’ control on the shop floor.12  
 Allis-Chalmers’s management held fast to its antiunion tra-
dition, bitterly fighting and beating the strike. The company’s 
antiunion swagger had accrued over the years. Unlike the Big 
Three auto manufacturers in the late 1930s, the farm implement 
industry had never been humbled by major union victories. In-
fighting within the national UAW exacerbated the local’s disad-
vantages, emboldened management’s resolve to wait out the 
strikers, and contributed to the strike’s failure.13  
 The loss of the Allis-Chalmers strike helped end the infight-
ing in the UAW between supporters of the newly elected union 
president, Walter Reuther, and the Thomas-Addes-Leonard 
coalition (TAL). Reuther supporters generally accommodated 
Cold War priorities, including anti-Communism, and champi-
oned a brand of business unionism that valued cooperation 
over conflict with employers while securing union goals through 
labor statesmanship among leaders of labor, business, and gov-
ernment. TAL supporters were a more mixed bag ideologically, 
ranging from progressive New Dealers to Communists. They 
held the coalition together with an affinity for the early organ-
izational strategies of the CIO unions that, like the FE, stressed 
the primacy of the union’s economic purpose and understood 
red-baiting to be a strategy to divide and weaken the labor 
movement.14  
                                                 
12. Meyer, “Stalin over Wisconsin,” 158–59; Halpern, UAW Politics in the Cold 
War Era, 173–75. 
13. Goode, Infighting in the UAW, 94; Halpern, UAW Politics in the Cold War Era, 
174. 
14. Halpern, UAW Politics in the Cold War Era, 128.  
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UE cartoonist Fred Wright used his running capitalist caricature, Mr. 
Blowhard, to promote the UE’s position that red-baiting was used to 
distract workers from economic issues. From a collection of cartoons by 
Fred Wright from the UE News and other UE publications held by the 
State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City (SHSI).
 Walter Reuther’s anti-Communist position gained traction 
with the failure of the left-led Allis-Chalmers strike. It was fur-
ther strengthened several months after the strike’s end in March 
1947 with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, legislation that 
Allis-Chalmers officials had played an important role in devel-
oping.15 The Taft-Hartley Act was a blow against all of organ-
ized labor, as it limited tactics such as wildcat strikes that had 
been used successfully to build the CIO. The law also outlawed 
secondary boycotts, ended the closed union shop, and allowed 
states to pass right-to-work legislation.  
 The Taft-Hartley Act hit left-led unions especially hard be-
cause it required elected union leaders to sign affidavits affirm-
ing that they were not members of the Communist Party or risk 
decertification by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). 
                                                 
15. Ibid., 174. 
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Left-led unions in the CIO, such as the FE and the UE, initially 
stood by their constitutions, which prohibited discrimination 
based on political affiliation, so they ignored the affidavits until 
the end of 1949. The UAW, on the other hand, quickly complied 
with the law in 1947. Reuther was by no means in favor of Taft-
Hartley, but the non-Communist affidavit requirement worked 
to his advantage by discrediting his left-wing opponents. As far 
as Reuther was concerned, few unions were more Communist-
dominated than the UAW’s jurisdictional rival, the FE.16  
 The FE rank-and-file’s resistance to postwar UAW raids had 
roots in the loyalty established when the FE became the first to 
force Harvester into signing a union contract. After the failure of 
Harvester’s company unions following World War I, workers in 
Harvester’s Chicago Tractor Works had enlisted the help of the 
short-lived Communist Party industrial union, the Trade Union 
Unity League (TUUL). In 1938 those workers used the protection 
of the recently passed Wagner Act to win the first ever NLRB 
election at International Harvester.17 The FE came into existence 
officially as an affiliate of the nascent Steel Workers’ Organizing 
Committee (FESWOC), a growing force in the new CIO.  
 The union’s foothold in Harvester’s Chicago Tractor Works 
provided a base of operations that would successfully extend 
the FESWOC to other Harvester plants, including those in the 
Quad Cities. By the end of World War II, the FESWOC would 
capitalize on assistance from the National War Labor Board to 
gain certification, a general wage increase, a strengthened griev-
ance procedure, and a maintenance-of-membership clause.18 
Those gains helped the union attract members and win its own 
international CIO charter in 1942, when it became the United 
Farm Equipment and Metal Workers of America (FE).  
 The new charter did not sit well with the UAW, which saw 
farm equipment workers as a natural growth sector, given the 
                                                 
16. Ibid., 205.  
17. Ibid., 77–82, 85. 
18. Gary M. Fink, ed., Labor Unions (Westport, CT, 1977), 90; Robert Ozanne, A 
Century of Labor-Management Relations at McCormick and International Harvester 
(Madison, WI, 1967), 200–208; Toni Gilpin, “Left by Themselves: A History of 
the United Farm Equipment and Metal Workers Union, 1938–1955” (Ph.D. 
diss., Yale University, 1992), 88–106. 
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similarities between automobile and farm machinery produc-
tion. By 1937, the UAW had achieved considerable success in 
the farm equipment industry, mainly in Allis-Chalmers, J. I. 
Case, and International Harvester truck plants.19 The CIO, along 
with the FE and the UAW, sought a merger that would unite the 
workers in the farm equipment industry, but several botched 
attempts revealed irreconcilable visions of trade unionism.20 
With hopes of a peaceful merger gone, the Reuther-led UAW 
sought to incorporate the FE on a local-by-local basis through 
aggressive raiding. 
 Prospects looked good for the UAW. In 1948 the UAW won 
a controversial election at the FE’s largest local at the Caterpillar 
Tractor plant in Peoria, Illinois, whose 16,000 workers represented 
25 percent of the FE’s membership. In addition, Pat Greathouse 
was well on the way to rebuilding the formerly militant Allis-
Chalmers Local 248 in Reuther’s image.21 But when Greathouse 
directed his attention to the FE in the Quad Cities in 1949, he 
got a taste of the bitter opposition the UAW would encounter 
over the next six years. After the February 11 riot, Ed Neilson, 
president of FE Local 111, seemed to challenge the UAW to en-
gage in more raids in the Quad Cities: “We’re going to protect 
our rights,” he asserted. “And if we affiliate with the UAW, 
we’ll do it at our convention in a democratic manner. We will 
not be forced or strong-armed into doing anything!”22  
                                                 
19. Meyer, “Stalin over Wisconsin,” 64–68.  
20. For more on the complex politics surrounding the proposed merger, see the 
conflicting analyses in Goode, Infighting in the UAW, 103; and Gilpin, “Left by 
Themselves,” 229–33. 
21. Preferring to deal with the UAW, Caterpillar was able to arrange an early 
NLRB election in which the FE would not be allowed to participate due to lo-
cal leaders’ refusal to sign non-Communist affidavits. FE supporters pursued 
the awkward and difficult position of urging their fellow workers to vote “no 
union” and continuing as a noncertified but popularly endorsed union. The 
FE lost by a two-to-one margin to the UAW, compelling the FE’s leadership 
to conduct an immediate referendum with the membership over the affidavit 
issue in June 1948. In what would be the first of many pragmatic compromises 
made by FE members during the Cold War, the referendum passed by a sub-
stantial majority, making the FE the first left-led union to abide by the non-
Communist affidavits. See Goode, Infighting in the UAW, 105; and Gilpin, “Left 
by Themselves,” 204–14. 
22. Rock Falls Record, 2/11/1949. 
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THE FE did affiliate on its own democratic terms with another 
union, though not with the UAW. Following the failed merger 
with the UAW in 1947, the CIO executive board gave the FE an 
ultimatum: merge with the UAW or have its charter formally 
withdrawn. Considering expulsion imminent, the FE executive 
board began merger discussions with the UE in the months 
leading up to the 1949 CIO convention. 
 By 1949, the UE and the FE had a great deal in common. 
Formally welcomed into the CIO in 1936, the UE represented 
industrial workers in the burgeoning radio and electrical sec-
tors. In 1937 the UE took a turn to the left when it welcomed 
15,000 workers allied with James J. Matles’s Communist-
dominated Federation of Metal and Allied Unions. The UE’s 
leftist leadership guided the union’s dramatic membership 
growth throughout the 1940s. Like the FE, the UE fell victim to 
intra-CIO raids throughout the 1940s as the CIO’s leadership 
solidified its anti-Communist position. Frustrated with raids, 
the UE requested a no-raiding agreement from the CIO, which 
was refused. In turn, the UE ceased paying dues to the CIO and 
was expelled during the 1949 convention, which declared that 
the CIO would “no longer tolerate within the family of the CIO 
the Communist Party masquerading as a labor union.”23  
 The UE, with more than 400,000 members, allowed for 
generous merger terms, as the boost in membership would be 
needed in what were certain to be a stormy next few years.24 
The FE was allowed to maintain its organizational infrastruc-
ture, officers, and constitution and an autonomous Farm Equip-
ment Council that would control contract negotiations in the 
farm equipment locals. FE locals were even allowed to maintain 
their former local numbers and name: FE-UE. With strong en-
dorsement from the FE leadership, the membership approved 
the merger, with 84 percent voting in favor. One resolution on 
the merger, passed by FE Local 822 in the Quad Cities, praised 
                                                 
23. Fink, Labor Unions, 79–83. Two fine histories of the UE cover the UE’s rise 
and fall in considerable depth: Ronald L. Filippelli and Mark McColloch, Cold 
War in the Working Class: The Rise and Decline of the United Electrical Workers 
(Albany, NY, 1995); and Ronald W. Schatz, The Electrical Workers: A History of 
Labor at General Electric and Westinghouse, 1923–1960 (Urbana and Chicago, 1983).  
24. Gilpin, “Left by Themselves,” 245–46.  
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the UE’s commitment to “democratic, rank and file unionism” 
but acknowledged that the merger was not ideal as it failed to 
unite the workers in the industry.25  
 The UE was confident in its independence, but understood 
that preserving its core ideals conflicted with the goal of achiev-
ing labor unity. In fact, the UE took important steps after expul-
sion to resist isolation from an increasingly hostile CIO. To the ire 
of several expelled left-led unions hoping to create a powerful 
“third labor federation,” the UE, the largest expelled union, was 
not interested and put a halt to the project. At the 1950 UE na-
tional convention, a labor unity resolution opposed such a course, 
suggesting that “the proponents of such a move demonstrate a 
lack of confidence that rank and file resistance to the sell-out 
leadership of the CIO and AFL unions can be successfully de-
veloped within these unions.”26  
 Such optimism about the potential resistance of the CIO 
rank-and-file, however, did not reflect the gravity of UE’s situa-
tion. Although the addition of roughly 50,000 FE members gave 
the UE nearly a half-million dues-paying members in 1950, its 
numbers were fluid and declining. The newly CIO-chartered 
jurisdictional rival to the UE, the anti-Communist International 
Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (IUE), achieved 
initial success in some of the largest UE East Coast locals of 
Westinghouse and General Electric. By 1953, CIO union raids 
and substantial industry layoffs had whittled the combined UE-
FE membership down to 203,000.27
 The labor unity resolution, which was drafted anew every 
year at both national and district conventions, would prove an 
important and controversial forum for the future disaffiliation 
of the FE-UE Quad Cities locals in UE District 8. Significantly, 
the labor unity resolution at the 1950 national convention pro-
                                                 
25. Ibid., 246–47; “Resolution on UE-FE Merger,” December 1949, UE District 
Council Eight Records, 1938–1955 (hereafter cited as UE8 Records), Iowa Labor 
Collection, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City.  
26. “Labor Unity,” ca. 1950, UE8 Records. For more on the interest in creating 
such a left-led “third labor federation,” see Judith Stepan-Norris and Maurice 
Zeitlin, Left Out: Reds and America’s Industrial Unions (New York, 2003), esp. 
297–327. 
27. Schatz, The Electrical Workers, 232. 
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After its exile from the CIO in 1949, the UE 
struggled to reconcile its principled independ-
ence with its desire to unite industrial workers. 
Cover from UE pamphlet, 1952, SHSI.
posed an ambiguous definition for “labor unity.” Stating that a 
“sound program for labor unity” was necessary for the UE to 
survive, the resolution failed to outline such a program or hint 
at what might be sacrificed to achieve such unity if push came 
to shove — something that the local delegates of UE District 8 
would point out repeatedly after five years of waiting in vain 
for such a program.28  
 
AFTER LEAVING THE CIO, the FE proved more successful 
in maintaining its locals than did its UE counterparts. No UAW 
raids on old FE locals between 1949 and 1953 were successful; 
the FE-UE was able to retain all of its Quad Cities locals over 
those four years. In the months leading up to the renegotiation 
of the FE-UE’s contract with International Harvester in 1952, the 
                                                 
28. “Labor Unity.” 
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union retained many key contract provisions won in 1941 and 
maintained them by striking every contract year except 1949.29  
 To retain membership against UAW raids, the FE-UE em-
phasized its contractual advantages. The FE-UE literature high-
lighted advantages in paid holidays, overtime, vacations, night 
bonuses, and clauses that protected plantwide seniority with 
broad job classifications, but the core of the FE-UE’s appeal was 
its strong grievance and steward system. An FE-UE contract 
barred foremen from the first step of a grievance, allowed for 
a union steward for every shift in each department, gave dis-
charged and suspended employees access to the grievance pro-
cedure, and, perhaps most important, let the stewards handle 
grievances on company time. In comparable UAW contracts, 
the number of stewards was limited to ten per plant, workers 
were required to initiate their own grievances, discharged and 
suspended employees had no grievance recourse, and stewards 
had to handle grievances on their own time outside of work.30  
 The strong grievance and steward system was the backbone 
of the FE-UE and was pivotal in organizing shop-floor actions. 
One aspect of the FE-UE contract that management considered 
a constant nuisance was the right of workers to walk out during 
the span of a contract when the grievance procedure had been 
exhausted. That clause allowed FE workers to maintain their 
militant tradition of work stoppages without the threat of a de-
bilitating lawsuit against the national union. The FE’s active 
steward system translated into more grievances, increasing the 
potential number of unresolved grievances that might lead to 
union action. Such militancy did not always translate into suc-
cess, and could even exacerbate workplace disputes, but left-led 
unions considered the rewards worth the risk.31  
 Such an attitude of workers’ control was exactly what the 
UAW was working to stamp out of the CIO. With Walter Reu-
ther’s ascension, the UAW agreed to help the company curtail 
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unauthorized work stoppages and discipline members in ex-
change for contract concessions as well as assurances that the 
national union would not be sued under the Taft-Hartley Act 
for any illegal walkouts. The UAW leadership failed to control 
all desired work stoppages among its members, but when com-
pared to its FE counterparts, fundamental differences are clear. 
From 1945 through 1951, the UAW and FE represented approxi-
mately the same number of workers at International Harvester, 
with the UAW locals doing similar work in Harvester truck 
plants. During that period, the FE locals organized 849 work 
stoppages to the UAW’s 171.32  
 The FE’s aggressive use of work stoppages on the shop floor 
framed how the union approached bargaining and contracts. FE 
contracts, like those of other militant unions, were not long-term; 
they tended to be short and basic. Workers preferred such con-
tractual ambiguity because it allowed them more latitude in de-
fining what historian Steven Meyer calls the “workplace rule of 
law.” John Boynton, from one of the larger FE locals at Harvester 
in East Moline, recalled, “We had a little contract. It said what it 
meant, and it meant what it said.” Several FE locals around the 
country even operated without any contract. In the event of a 
workplace dispute, FE-UE leader Don Harris explained, “We 
were in favor of job action in order to get something done.”33  
 Workers took notice of the substantive differences between 
the contracts. Lawrence “Newt” Hoskinson of Local 104, who 
left the FE-UE because of its connection to the Communist Party 
and supported UAW raids, admitted that “our [FE] contract had 
always compared better than any UAW contract I ever seen. . . .  
I wish I had an old contract.”34 It is important to acknowledge, 
though, that many workers were attracted to Reuther’s promise 
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The UE sought to discredit the UAW raiding offensive 
by characterizing the raiders as criminals who used 
violence and intimidation instead of democracy to 
achieve their ends. UE leaflet, undated (1950s), SHSI.
that labor would enjoy a bigger share of the pie as the pie grew 
larger through uninterrupted production and growth, and 
many believed that Reuther’s long-term contracts would ensure 
stability and benefit them more financially in the long term. 
However, the failure of UAW raids and the barrage of work 
stoppages suggest that a commitment to militant unionism and 
FE-UE contracts prevailed. This edge in contracts, however, di-
minished after the union struck International Harvester in 1952.  
 Both the FE-UE and Harvester came to the bargaining table 
in 1952 with ambitious agendas. While the FE-UE sought to 
strengthen its shop floor presence by eliminating no-strike and 
slowdown language and increasing the number of stewards, 
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Harvester management chose 1952 as the year to eliminate once 
and for all “the worst contract in Harvester history.” The differ-
ence between FE-UE and UAW contracts was highlighted dur-
ing negotiations, as Harvester management openly aimed to 
settle on terms akin to its UAW contracts.35  
 The inevitable strike began on August 21, and involved 
some 23,000 FE members at Harvester plants across the country. 
Anticipating the strike, Harvester management instantly offered 
incentives to get replacement workers and succeeded in reopen-
ing its plants. The company’s back-to-work plan also exploited 
racial divisions among workers, which sparked minor violence 
in Chicago. That, in turn, persuaded the courts to issue a devas-
tating injunction that drastically diminished the picket lines.36  
 As the Red Scare and McCarthyism escalated, the main-
stream press in Iowa and Illinois also helped the company’s 
cause by highlighting questions surrounding Communism and 
the FE-UE. The FE strike was undoubtedly damaged by heavy 
press coverage of a Chicago-based House Un-American Activi-
ties Subcommittee investigation looking into Communism in 
industry. On September 14, four weeks into the strike, the Des 
Moines Register, Iowa’s most widely distributed daily, ran a 
front-page story on the recent testimony of two FE men out of 
the Quad Cities, Donald O. Spencer and Walter Rumsey, who 
testified to their own activities in the Communist Party and 
named as Communists several prominent FE leaders, who were 
at the time conducting the strike.37 Three days later, District 8 
regional director and open Communist William Sentner was 
arrested in the Quad Cities on charges of conspiring to over-
throw the U.S. government by force. Sentner’s arrest, in particu-
lar, would fill the pages of local newspapers and UAW handbills 
in the time leading up to his guilty verdict in 1954.38   
 On November 16, after 87 difficult days out, and with 
roughly 8,000 strikers already back on the job, all Harvester 
plants operational, and no favorable resolution in sight, FE 
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A massive picket line from the Harvester strike parades through a  down-
town area in the Quad Cities in 1952. Photo from SHSI.
leaders called off the strike. Harvester management presented 
FE negotiators with a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer, and UE presi-
dent James Matles and former FE president Gerald Fielde 
signed it. In a letter informing the locals of the settlement, Fielde 
announced that the union had settled a three-year contract “on 
terms substantially the same as in the UAW-CIO Contract.”39 
With this inferior contract signed and subsequently approved 
by a beleaguered constituency six months later, the FE-UE con-
tract lost its uniquely militant structure, rooted in an active 
steward and grievance system, and with it one of its strongest 
competitive edges against UAW raids.  
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CONSIDERING THE STRIKE’S DEVASTATION and the poor 
contract, the ensuing loyalty of farm equipment workers at Har-
vester to the FE-UE surprised the UAW. As 1952 was a bargain-
ing year, and thus an opportune time for union raids, the UAW 
sought to capitalize on discontent from the strike by gathering 
the requisite number of signatures to petition elections in three 
of the largest FE-UE locals. The first two elections, conducted in 
Chicago and Indiana in April 1953, resulted in decisive FE-UE 
victories. No doubt based on those results, the UAW withdrew 
from the election at East Moline one week before the election.40  
 Yet all was not well with the FE-UE in the Quad Cities. The 
FE-UE easily won the uncontested 1953 election in East Moline 
with 2,163 votes, but 1,302 workers were dissatisfied enough 
with the FE-UE to vote the only other option, “no union.”41 That 
substantial vote of no confidence in the FE-UE was the result of 
a concerted effort by an organized group of pro-UAW workers 
inside the plant calling itself the Employees Cooperative Asso-
ciation (ECA). To the initial disbelief and sustained ire of FE-UE 
loyalists and UE national officers, the man leading the charge 
against the FE-UE was one of the most militant, active, and 
popular leaders in the FE-UE, John Watkins.  
 Watkins’s controversial decision to embrace a former foe —  
Reuther’s UAW — illustrates how some union leaders came to 
view mainstream unionism as the only option available at the 
time to preserve FE’s tradition of labor militancy in the Quad 
Cites. Starting out as a machine operator in Harvester’s East 
Moline Works, Watkins became an early leader in the union and 
in 1938 was one of the nine FE leaders to sign the certificate of 
affiliation with the CIO. Through the years of strikes and tough 
negotiations, Watkins’s temper and intransigence earned him a 
reputation among the Harvester labor relations staff as one of 
“the two livest wires in FE-CIO” (the other was Gerald Fielde). 
At the time of the 1952 strike and his dismissal from the FE-UE, 
Watkins was serving as an FE-UE international representative 
and the de facto leader of the FE in the Quad Cities.42  
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This man, who followed John Watkins’s lead into the UAW at the end of 
the International Harvester Strike in 1952, displays some picket line the-
atrics for passing motorists. Photo from SHSI. 
 Fiercely loyal to the interests of the FE in the Quad Cities 
above all else, Watkins approached the merger with the UE cau-
tiously from the beginning. The FE and the UE shared historic 
ties to the Communist Party, but it is clear that although the FE 
locals in the Quad Cities were a bulwark of labor militancy, they 
were never a haven for the kind of political or social radicalism 
championed by the UE and many FE leaders. Watkins was quite 
progressive on such matters, but he understood his constituency 
and tried to represent their interests, which caused friction be-
tween the two unions.43  
 The left-wing stances on domestic and foreign policy issues 
that the UE commonly took could spur internal dissent. At the 
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UE’s 1950 national convention, for example, a foreign policy res-
olution was introduced that strongly condemned the Marshall 
Plan as a tool of Big Business. The resolution also encouraged 
increased cooperation with Russia “to find a peaceful solution to 
all differences and to discuss the terrors of atomic weapons and 
to take action to avoid their use.”44 The large FE-UE Local 104 at 
Harvester’s East Moline Works was one of the few delegations 
to vote unanimously against the resolution. The one familiar 
UE leader working in the Quad Cities who was open about his 
Communism, District Representative William Sentner, generally 
kept his Communist politics out of the union’s everyday busi-
ness. In fact, many active FE-UE members in the Quad Cities 
who knew Sentner refused to believe that he was a Communist.45  
 After the strike, Watkins began to see the UE’s continued 
emphasis on radical politics as a dangerous abstraction that 
distracted from local union business. As a key FE leader in the 
Quad Cities, Watkins worked extensively with UE District 8 
director Don Harris after the 1949 merger. The two did not get 
along, which interfered with a smooth transition for the merger. 
Watkins felt that the UE, through Harris, aimed to improperly 
influence the Quad Cities locals on political matters. After his 
expulsion from the UE in 1953, Watkins claimed that “in 1950 
Don Harris . . . began with the UE campaign to take over FE lo-
cals.” He added, “The issue has been and remains UE dictato-
rial control of FE locals for selfish political purposes.” Watkins 
also complained that UE Director of Organization James Matles 
criticized him for not carrying on “the proper political work 
within the local union.”46  
 The Quad Cities FE locals also lagged behind their progres-
sive counterparts in regard to civil rights in the workplace and 
union. Most unions in the CIO championed civil rights, but left-
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led unions were especially active in this regard. Unlike FE locals 
in Chicago, the Quad Cities locals had no African Americans in 
leadership positions as late as 1953.47 Following the 1952 annual 
convention of the National Negro Labor Council, a short-lived 
project of progressive unions, both black and white members 
of the FE initiated steps to establish a Quad City Negro Labor 
Council. The provisional committee, seven of nine of whom 
were members of the FE-UE, called attention to the fact that 
“there are few, and in many cases, no Negroes employed in the 
industrial plants in the Quad Cities.”48    
 The absence of African American workers in the farm equip-
ment industry and in the FE locals reflects the racial segregation 
prevalent in the Quad Cities at the time. Intent on documenting 
and combating what many saw as Jim Crow laws operating in 
the Quad Cities, a small group of progressive Catholic priests, 
labor organizers, and reformers formed the League for Social 
Justice. After two years of research and polling locally, the 
group published Citizen 2nd Class: Negro Segregation and Dis-
crimination in Davenport, 1951. The report documented a “high 
level of discrimination,” which was “strictly, if not officially en-
forced” in all areas of life. Davenport’s 2,500 African Americans 
(out of the city’s total population of 74,594) were forced into two 
dense ghettos with substandard education and were refused 
most public services. The survey found no African Americans 
employed as teachers, office workers, or civil servants; and 
among 18 large firms employing more than 10,000 workers, 
there were only 175 black workers in the lowest-paying jobs. In 
the case of the farm implement industry, Harvester was one of 
the few that employed African Americans, but, as the FE noted 
in 1954, the firm “maintained a rigid policy of concentrating 
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them in the main in the foundry and on the lowest paid and 
dirtiest jobs in the plant.”49  
 Recent scholarship on race and the CIO suggests that the 
ideal of “nonracial syndicalism” championed by CIO unions 
was often not realized in workplaces where stratification by 
race and by wage or skill level coincided. Historian Bruce Nel-
son notes that for white workers, “genuine equality for blacks, 
based on their ability and seniority, could impose an economic 
cost on them; it could mean giving up their privileged access to 
the skilled jobs, higher pay, and better, safer working environ-
ment that the wages of whiteness proffered.”50 Certainly com-
panies played a central role in racially segregating workplaces, 
but workers and their labor unions played a role as well.  
 Both the UAW and FE-UE espoused civil rights in the work-
place and union, but the UAW was not nearly as aggressive on 
this front. Historian Robert Zieger has shown that under Walter 
Reuther’s leadership, the UAW fully respected the racial lines 
keeping black workers from higher-paying skilled positions. 
Zieger’s conclusion is bolstered by Mohammad A. Chaichian’s 
research on race relations in Dubuque — another community 
up the Mississippi River from the Quad Cities with sizable in-
dustry and comparably small percentages of black citizens. In 
his examination of an old John Deere FE local that joined the 
UAW in 1947, Chaichian found an astounding lack of both civil 
rights activism and racial sensitivity; for example, members of 
the local dressed in blackface for their Christmas party in 1950.51  
 To suggest that there was likely tension between the na-
tional UE and the FE-UE locals of the Quad Cities in regard to 
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The FE-UE locals in the Quad Cities officially espoused civil rights, al-
though union social gatherings, like this one at Local 810, illustrate the 
stark reality of racial segregation.  
civil rights and foreign policy does not mean that the Quad Cit-
ies workers were of one mind or eschewed all aspects of left-led 
social unionism.52 Rather, it serves as a reminder that in the 
minds of workers, labor militancy did not always come pack-
aged along with a progressive agenda on civil rights or a desire 
to make peace with the Soviet Union. In this respect, the Quad 
Cities FE-UE locals resemble Gerald Zahavi’s “right-wing 
Communists” in Schenectady, New York, where, he notes, “In 
calling for a dramatic escalation of organizing work among 
blacks and women, interjecting foreign policy issues . . . and 
applying rigorous tests of ideological fealty,” the UE “intro-
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duced additional strains into a local party organization already 
under siege within the plants and without.”53  
 When the UE was a stable independent union offering su-
perior contracts, such incompatibility might not have presented 
a problem. However, as it became clear that the UE’s political 
radicalism in the Cold War climate would only interfere with 
trade union business and local solidarity, the FE-UE workers 
had to continually weigh the benefits of left-led unionism 
against the immediate and potentially devastating costs.  
 
THE EVENT that broke the fragile alliance between John Wat-
kins and the UE occurred during the 1952 strike. The amount of 
UE financial and staffing resources allotted to the old FE locals 
had been a continuous source of friction throughout the merger, 
but feelings of being shortchanged by the UE national office hit 
new heights in the midst of the strike. The UE, struggling to 
keep afloat as an independent union, could not afford to wage 
the kind of strike many Harvester workers expected. Burton C. 
Foster, who was involved in the strike, cites the strike as the 
turning point against the UE; he recalled that “there was very 
little, if any, financial support given to the farm equipment 
workers by UE. The farm equipment people felt like they were 
second-class citizens within UE.”54  
 To compound the frustration with the UE, many in the FE-
UE felt that signing the inferior contract at the end of the strike 
was not in the best interests of the farm equipment workers. 
John Watkins, in particular, thought that returning to work 
without a contract and militantly governing labor relations at 
Harvester with shop floor actions would be a wiser course than 
being saddled for three years with an inferior contract. Because 
such a course would have left all FE-UE locals at Harvester 
open to immediate UAW raids, many workers concluded that 
top UE leadership signed the contract in order to retain dues-
paying members.55  
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These Farmall workers, members of the Employees Cooperative Association, 
proudly display signed request cards to be sent to the National Labor Rela-
tions Board in hopes of prompting a new election to decertify the FE-UE. 
Photo from SHSI.
 The turbulent month of August 1953 ended in dual unionism 
in all of the Harvester locals. Early in the month, John Watkins 
was finally fired from his officer post in the FE-UE because, as 
James Matles put it, he “continually worked to undermine the 
policies, program and rules of the International Union.”56 Wat-
kins was not the only one pushing for UAW representation 
while still an officer of the FE-UE, though. In fact, half of the 
officers of Farmall Works Local 109 in Rock Island were infor-
mally working for the UAW, including the local’s president. 
Burton C. Foster of FE Local 104 explained the chaotic dual 
unionism that spread across the Harvester shop floor:  
The union hall remained in possession of the FE people who had 
moved over to UAW, and the UAW sign went up. Three of the FE 
people were now on the UAW staff. The company continued to 
recognize FE, and they had no one to fill stewards’ positions or 
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Alberta Tatman and Carl Barkeley examine a smashed office window at 
Local 109, a likely byproduct of pro-UAW sentiment. Photo from SHSI.
anything else until the layoffs came. When the layoffs came, of 
course people were rushing in to take stewards’ jobs in order to 
have preferential seniority. So the UAW people, the people who 
were now UAW, told UAW people to take the FE steward job. So 
that nobody could trust anybody.57  
 Adding insult to injury, the two sides capped off the tur-
bulent month with “the bloodiest union brawl in years in the 
Quad-Cities” after rival meetings on a Saturday morning.58 The 
disorder prompted the NLRB to take an unusual and extreme 
measure. Although the FE-UE’s contract did not expire until 
1955, the NLRB allowed an early election for Locals 104 and 
106, the latter of which had quit functioning entirely since the 
previous August. The NLRB ruling, which was delivered six 
months after the Saturday morning riot, allowed new elections, 
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Picketers sympathetic to the UAW display their frustration over how the 
UE national officers settled the Harvester strike. Photo from SHSI.
noting that a union contract is supposed to stabilize labor rela-
tions, which the current FE-UE contract obviously was not doing. 
In May 1954 the UAW won by a landslide in Harvester Locals 
104 and 106. In much the same way, FE-UE’s largest local in the 
Quad Cities, Local 109 in the Farmall division of International 
Harvester, voted UAW in early January 1955.59  
 After years of unsuccessful UAW raids, a combination of 
factors came together after 1953 to facilitate a UAW victory. The 
intensification of the Cold War, with the war in Korea and the in-
creased visibility of HUAC hearings, changed the tenor of red-
baiting, but red-baiting had been widespread since the early 
1940s and the recent events probably did not change many minds 
that were not already made up on Communism and the FE-UE. 
The vast majority of FE-UE members were not Communists 
and, like Junior Kelley at John Deere and Co., trusted their left-
wing leaders. Kelley never thought that anyone he knew was 
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trying to “overthrow the government.” Rather, he concluded 
that they were targets simply because they were “militant or-
ganizers doing the worker too much good.”60  
 Junior Kelley’s impression that the Communist Party did 
not run the FE-UE is backed up by the best available facts. It is 
clear that many leaders in the FE and UE were either members 
of or sympathetic to the Communist Party (CP), but neither 
the FE nor the UE followed the trade union policy of the CP 
between 1949 and 1955. In fact, they often did the opposite. 
Immediately after its expulsion in 1949, the UE ignored the CP’s 
calls to dissolve and infiltrate mainstream labor organizations. 
In 1950 CP Labor Secretary John Williamson wrote that “‘deci-
sive forces in the top leadership’ of the UE were ‘resisting an 
approach of real united action of U.E and I.U.E.,’ and he con-
demned their ‘blind factionalism.’”61 When the FE-UE locals 
did join mainstream labor unions, it was because of rank-and-
file, not CP, demands for labor unity. 
 Infighting, not anti-Communism, was the true source of dis-
content driving members from these FE-UE locals. The union 
schism on the shop floor disrupted every aspect of union life. In 
such a working atmosphere, instructions from the national UE 
to simply remain loyal and stick it out no doubt rang hollow to 
many. Compounding the frustration with the national UE was 
the geographic isolation of the Quad Cities FE locals; many old 
FE members felt like second-class citizens in the UE. In this dif-
ficult situation, John Watkins and those who followed him into 
the UAW sought to get off of what appeared to be a sinking 
ship while they still had a voice in the matter.  
 
THE FE eventually left the UE en masse and merged into the 
UAW in May 1955, but by then the Quad Cities locals in District 
8 had already charted an independent course. At the beginning 
of 1955, the FE still represented some 2,000 workers in the Quad 
Cities. Those workers were employed principally at John Deere 
Plow Works, French and Hecht, and Herman Nelson Corpora-
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tion.62 Spared the drama of the factional shop floor union fight 
that occurred at Harvester, these locals used the framework of 
their union, principally the UE’s district and local bodies, to try 
to work out a resolution with the UE national officers that might 
achieve labor unity without disaffiliation. 
 In February 1955 the national UE General Executive Board 
(GEB) met expressly to address the accelerating loss of members 
and prospects for labor unity. The meeting did not go well. When 
the GEB set up a committee to explore the possibility of merging 
into the newly merged AFL-CIO, three top UE officers refused 
to participate. The meeting’s failure to achieve any tangible re-
sults prompted delegates at the UE District 8 Convention the 
next month to pass a resolution that pushed the national officers 
to conduct promised “discussions for unity.”63  
 The tension between the national UE office and District 8 
came to a head in September at the 1955 national UE convention 
in Cleveland. In a lively debate on labor unity, District 8 Presi-
dent Don Harris noted that the rank and file’s demand for unity 
had “finally reflected itself in the movement on the part of the 
leadership.” The national UE was amenable to joining a unified 
labor movement. In early 1955 UE Director of Organization 
James J. Matles met with the president of the International As-
sociation of Machinists (IAM) to discuss a merger. The IAM 
refused a merger but would accept individual locals. Matles, 
willing only to accept a merger that would “give real meaning 
to the proposed unity,” rejected the offer. To Matles, “real mean-
ing” meant a merger that would retain the UE constitution and 
organizational structure — a merger comparable to the FE mer-
ger with the UE in 1949.64
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 Given their desperate situation, delegates from District 8 
were more amenable to compromise on the “real meaning” of 
labor unity. The decisive moment for disaffiliation came at the 
October 1955 District 8 convention in the Quad Cities. Attend-
ing were two of the three top UE officials, Albert J. Fitzgerald 
and Julius Emspak, who again made the case that the essence of 
rank-and-file democracy and militancy would not hold up un-
less the union merged into the mainstream together. In response, 
local delegates took turns hammering the national president 
for the lack of results at the union’s top levels over the past six 
months. With the impending merger of the formerly antagonis-
tic AFL and CIO looming large, the delegates noted the tragic 
irony of the national UE’s concept of labor unity: “The policy 
of holding UE apart as an independent union in the face of the 
new labor federation is bearing fruit in the fragmentation of the 
UE by the very policy that speaks against fragmentation.” To 
the disappointment of the national officers, the delegates voted 
70–9 to leave the UE and merge on a local-by-local basis with 
either the IAM or UAW if the national union did not act by No-
vember 20.65
 
THE NATIONAL UNION did not act, so by the end of 1955 the 
remaining FE-UE locals were left to engineer their disaffiliation 
“on a principled basis.” The FE-UE locals in the Quad Cities 
voted independently to affiliate with the IAM (Machinists) over 
the UAW, even though the UAW had a much larger local pres-
ence in the Quad Cities and in the farm equipment industry na-
tionally. The choice suggests that the FE-UE locals determined 
that the IAM was more accommodating to their principles.66
 With roots in craft unionism and the AFL, the Machinists 
had been slow to organize industrial workers. Between 1912 
and 1926 the union’s socialist-influenced leader, William Johns-
ton, expanded the organization’s decentralized structure to ac-
commodate rank-and-file democracy and local autonomy in the 
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union. The Quad Cities, in particular, were a hotbed of socialist 
labor radicalism during that period.67 These structural reforms 
stayed in place when the Machinists began to organize along a 
joint craft/industrial basis in 1937. By the 1950s, the IAM had 
grown to 500,000 members and was unique among its competi-
tors; its “emphasis on local autonomy,” historian Mark Perlman 
notes, “sets the IAM apart from other large industrial unions in 
manufacturing. Unlike the steelworkers’ or the autoworkers’ 
locals, the local lodges of the IAM still maintain considerable 
bargaining power and autonomy.”68  
 Despite its history of progressivism and socialism, the IAM 
took a hard anti-Communist line in the 1950s. Unlike the UAW, 
however, the Machinists could transcend red-baiting and realis-
tically market themselves as a union with “the most democratic 
procedures in the country.” Literature produced during raids 
pointed out that “in IAM-AFL every single member votes in the 
election of President and Secretary-Treasurer of the International 
Union,” whereas in the UE, the top three officials were elected 
by delegates at the national conference, or, as the Machinists put 
it, “handpicked by a machine controlled convention dominated 
by Communists!”69  
 Just as James J. Matles was attracted to the possibility of 
merging the UE with the Machinists as a whole in early 1955, so 
too were militant local leaders in the Quad Cities out shopping 
for a new union. Wayne “Banjo” Smith, president of Local 150 
at John Deere Plow, defended the FE-UE until he cast one of the 
seven dissenting votes to disaffiliate from the UE. After years of 
fighting off the UAW, Smith recalls, “I had it burned into my 
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heart that I wanted no part of the UAW,” so he proceeded to 
help guide his local toward the Machinists. Leaders of Local 150 
had met earlier in the year with officials from the UAW and IAM 
to discuss terms for affiliation and found that the IAM offered 
terms more congruent with FE-UE–style unionism. For example, 
in the UAW, “the International must be asked for authorization 
to strike,” whereas in the IAM, a local is free to call its own strikes 
and must only notify the Grand Lodge and comply with the Taft-
Hartley Act. In addition to the broad conditions for affiliation 
set at the District 8 Conference, each local was allowed to draft 
conditions of its own. And unlike the UAW, the IAM agreed to 
all of Local 150’s 11 conditions, several of which guaranteed a 
foundation for rank-and-file democracy and local autonomy. 
Another militant FE-UE local leader, Carroll Wright of Local 822 
at Herman Nelson Co., proclaimed that “I was instrumental . . . 
about getting the majority of the people in this area to go Ma-
chinist.” Wright recalled telling the rank and file at the remain-
ing FE-UE locals that “we had been guaranteed full autonomy 
as far as the Machinists, that we’d make our own decisions. . . . 
we’d maintain the same set-up we had before as far as our 
stewards, our chief steward, our negotiating committees, shop 
committees. You know, none of that would be changed. And it 
wasn’t.”70
 The Machinists offered an attractive alternative for those 
looking to avoid the bureaucracy of the UAW and the myriad 
problems that plagued the FE-UE. It is telling that when these 
remaining FE-UE locals were given a reprieve from raids and 
the dual unions on the shop floor and allowed an informed de-
cision between the UAW and the IAM, they chose to go with 
the Machinists. The Quad Cities locals were not the only UE de-
fectors to choose the IAM. District 8 was the first UE district to 
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disaffiliate, but was soon followed by three more: UE Districts 3 
and 7 went into the IAM, and District 9 split between the IAM, 
UAW, and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.71  
 If the IAM had actively contested elections from the begin-
ning at International Harvester, it might have diminished the 
strong support for the UAW. But the IAM had mostly stayed 
out of the UAW/FE-UE conflict. Burton Foster likely represents 
many Harvester workers who joined the UAW simply to get 
out of the UE. Foster recalled, “I had nothing against the IAM, 
except that I felt that Harvester workers were organized basi-
cally almost totally by UAW.”72  
 The move of the FE-UE Harvester locals to the UAW cannot 
be read as a rejection of militant and democratic unionism. John 
Watkins’s labor militancy never wavered as he led the charge 
toward the UAW at Harvester.73 Rather, Watkins’s case suggests 
that he was simply the first in a long line of militant union lead-
ers who sought to get out of the UE with the best deal they 
could.  
 
FE-UE WORKERS who joined the Machinists in 1955 were 
able to retain their local leaders and democratic autonomy, but 
over time those rights meant less and less as the unified labor 
movement of 1955 failed to live up to its lofty expectations. 
Carroll Wright, who served in the Machinists well past 1955, 
reflected on the decline of both the social and economic aspects 
of trade unionism in the Quad Cities: 
You talk to guys in the plant that had worked under FE, . . . UE 
and then afterwards, and had any real knowledge of the working 
conditions. . . . I’ve had hundreds of them tell me. It was a mistake. 
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. . . It’s big business now, I’ll tell you, just like you’re a number. 
You go in there and you put your time in. And this is true every-
where. . . . Herman Nelson plant, like I say, we were a close group. 
Right now, hell.74  
 In many respects, the UE’s national leadership in 1955 had 
foreseen the false promise of a powerful united labor movement 
whose bureaucratic structures capitalized on years of workers’ 
organization and came to eclipse their democratic voice. As 
Carroll Wright’s testimony suggests, the lack of such rank-and-
file engagement that came to define the new industrial unions 
of the AFL-CIO hastened a breakdown in social cohesion and 
left many committed union men feeling “like a number” in their 
unions as well as in their jobs. Indeed, the principled conditions 
set by individual FE-UE locals failed to make much of an im-
pact on the larger labor unions, and the desertion of those and 
other locals left the UE a crippled union without the numerical 
clout to affect the tenor of the labor movement nationally.  
 In hindsight, the conflict between UE locals and the national 
body in 1955 reflects a dire situation for locals and a national 
union backed into a corner. On the one hand, the national offi-
cers may not have appreciated just how difficult it was to stand 
by the UE when bitter union factions on the shop floors caused 
union business to cease functioning. On the other hand, the 
Quad Cities locals may not have appreciated that the only op-
tions available for the UE to enter mainstream labor entailed 
ceding UE’s core ideals. Instead, the UE chose to continue its 
difficult independent course and thus remains a small but pro-
gressive voice in the labor movement to this day.75  
 Yet it is also clear that decisions made by the UE between 
1949 and 1955 precipitated its decline in places such as the Quad 
Cities. Critical misreadings of the cultural and social climate as 
well as poorly gauging the willingness of labor’s rank and file 
to resist the CIO’s conservative course certainly contributed to 
the union’s difficult situation. The hope of the UE to pursue the 
path of successful independent unions such as the United Mine 
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Workers and the Machinists was not tempered by the reality of 
new antilabor legislation, the difficulty in maintaining its politi-
cally radical stance in the Cold War climate, or the ideological 
resonance that a united labor movement would have within its 
constituency. Indeed, the social conservatism of union members 
in the urban North became only more pronounced and complex 
for labor unions with the cultural upheaval spawned by the 
civil rights movement in the 1960s and the populist racism that 
ignited George Wallace’s presidential run in 1968.76
 Ultimately, the old FE locals merged with mainstream labor 
for reasons similar to those that motivated the FE’s merger with 
the UE in 1949. Beginning in 1953 at International Harvester, FE-
UE local leaders in the Quad Cities responded to a rank-and-file 
call for labor peace and unity and proceeded with difficult but 
necessary compromises. They did this not because red-baiting 
had finally made an impression or because they had embraced 
bureaucratic unionism, but rather because they saw in main-
stream labor organizations the practical potential to continue 
their effective tradition of rank-and-file democracy and mili-
tancy, the only kind of unionism they had known, which the 
national UE could promise but no longer provide. 
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